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ECONOMOU V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE: BLURRING THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN
CONSTITUTIONAL AND COMMON LAW TORT IMMUNITY
An individual injured by the tortious conduct of a state or federal
government employee historically has been barred from suit against
the government itself by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.' Un-
less the governmental unit has abrogated this immunity,2 the ag-
grieved party must seek redress in a personal damages action
against the employee. If the putative plaintiff adopts the latter tack,
however, he may confront a parallel immunity doctrine shielding
the public official personally from suit for torts allegedly committed
within the scope of his duties.
The federal case law3 governing federal officials' immunity4 from
suit for international torts arising from discretionary acts5 per-
1. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 970-87 (4th ed. 1971).
2. The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1970), is the federal government's
statutory abrogation of sovereign immunity from tort suit. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at
972-75. Section 2680 of the Act is a compendium of exceptions to the statute's applicability.
Within the scope of this Comment, the most important exclusion is that of intentional torts.
See note 67 infra.
3. As established in Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959), a companion case to the
Supreme Court's landmark absolute immunity decision in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564
(1959), the degree of immunity to be granted a federal employee is to be determined solely
by standards of the federal courts or Congress. The Court explained that the federal officer's
authority derived from federal sources, and that the grant of immunity was designed to
"promote the effective functioning of the Federal Government." Id. at 597. See Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963). Cf. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363
(1943) (federal law governs the rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper
it issues).
4. A technical distinction exists between the terms "privilege" and "immunity":
[PIrivilege avoids liability for tortious conduct only under particular circum-
stances, and because these circumstances make it just and reasonable that the
liability shall not be imposed, and so go to defeat the existence of the tort itself.
An immunity, on the other hand, avoids liability in tort under all circumstances,
within the limits of the immunity itself; it is conferred, not because of the
particular facts, but because of the status or position of the favored defendant;
and it does not deny the tort, but the resulting liability.
W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 970. Despite this distinction, the terms frequently are used
interchangeably. This Comment will use the term "immunity" except when quoting.
5. Immunity cases attempt to distinguish between discretionary acts, requiring the
exercise of judgment or decision-making, and ministerial acts, those of a mandated or clerical
nature. That neither is clearly defined renders any such distinction difficult. See Jaffe, Suits
Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HAxv. L. Rav. 209, 218-25 (1963).
Some courts have avoided the discretionary/ministerial determination problem by adopting
the approach suggested by the court in Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 299 F.2d
655 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 827 (1963):
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formed within the scope of their duties is largely the product of
decisions issued within the past 25 years. In 1959, the United States
Supreme Court held in Barr v. Matteol that a federal official was
absolutely immune from tort suit for a discretionary act committed
within the scope of that official's duty. In 1974, however, in Scheuer
v. Rhodes,7 the Supreme Court held that only a qualified immun-
ity,' predicated on proof of the officials' good faith and reasonable
belief in the valdity of their actions, was available to state executive
officials sued for violation of the plaintiffs' rights under Section 1983
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.1 Moreover, three years earlier, in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics,0 the Court had held that federal agents were liable for
damages for conduct that violated the plaintiff's fourth amendment
rights. On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit determined" that if deprivation of constitutional rights
There is no litmus paper test to distinguish acts of discretion, . .. and to require
a finding of "discretion" would merely postpone, for one step in the process of
reasoning, the determination of the real question-is the act complained of the
result of a judgment or decision which it is necessary that the Government
officials be free to make without fear or threat of vexatious or fictitious suits and
alleged personal liability?
Id. at 659.
6. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
7. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
8. Burkhart v. Saxbe, 397 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Pa. 1975), suggested the procedural
advantages accruing to the defendant who receives absolute immunity in that absolute im-
munity was deemed a total shield from civil liability, whereas qualified immunity was de-
scribed as merely an affirmative defense on the merits which must be alleged in the pleadings
and factually proven by the defendant. Id. at 502. If performing a discretionary act within
the scope of his duty, the government defendant who receives absolute immunity thus may
curtail the litigation at the pleading stage. The defendant under qualified immunity, on the
other hand, may be subjected to the time and expense of further proceedings as well as the
possible need to prove his good faith and reasonable belief, if those matters provide an issue
of fact. The phrase "qualified immunity," then, is in a sense a misnomer; to provide immun-
ity from liability, qualified immunity requires elements of proof by the defendant. This
distinction was highlighted by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972), in
which the court held that the defendants were not immune from damage suits based upon
allegations of violations of constitutional rights, but then proceeded to outline the availability
of a defense of good faith and probable cause. Id. at 1347. Little substantive difference seems
to exist between this affirmative defense and a qualified immunity standard. See generally
Note, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents: A New Direction in Federal Police Immunity,
24 HASTINGS L.J. 987 (1973).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
10. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
11. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d
Cir. 1972).
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was alleged the defendants were eligible only for qualified immun-
ity, similar to the Scheuer standard.'2
The courts' decisions have created a discordant profile of the
scope of federal executive officials tort immunity in failing to articu-
late the extent to which the degree of immunity is dependent on the
nature of the offense charged, on the jurisdictional basis of the suit,
or on the particular official duties performed. A recent federal exec-
utive immunity decision by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit highlights these disparities and omissions. In
Economou v. United States Department of Agriculture,'3 the court
held that various officials of the department and a subordinate
agency were entitled to qualified immunity from suit. The com-
plaint alleged that the defendants had maliciously instituted ad-
ministrative proceedings against the plaintiff and had issued a de-
famatory press release announcing the action. Although the claims
of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and libel were "cast in
constitutional terms,"" in substance they alleged common law
torts. Nevertheless, the court relied exclusively on the Supreme
Court's section 1983 holdings in determining that the defendants
were eligible only for qualified immunity.'5
This Comment submits that in failing to recognize the distinctive
features of constitutional torts that may compel the grant of quali-
fied immunity to government executive defendants, the Second Cir-
cuit erroneously equated common law tort immunity with the im-
munity to be granted in suits alleging a deprivation of constitutional
rights. Moreover, it is submitted that the court in Economou failed
to consider adequately the significance of the duties, in determining
the applicable immunity standard. However, a reexamination of the
policy considerations guiding the Supreme Court's Barr holding of
absolute immunity for federal executive defendants accused of com-
mon law torts suggests that a qualified immunity standard, requir-
ing proof of good faith and reasonable belief, is a sufficient safeguard
for federal executive officials. It is submitted that such a standard
would provide legitimate government functions the protection that
underlies any grant of immunity; at the same time, it would afford
12. See notes 7-9 supra and accompanying text.
13. 535 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted sub noma. Butz v. Economou, 45 U.S.L.W.
3570 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 76-709).
14. Id. at 690.
15. Id. at 696.
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a greater opportunity for the redress of legitimate injuries than does
the present absolute immunity doctrine of Barr v. Matteo.
EXECUTIVE IMMUNITY IN THE COMMON LAW TORT CONTEXT
The unsettled status of federal executive tort immunity can be
ascribed in part to an ambiguous background:'" in contrast to the
other branches of government, the rationale of immunity for federal
executive officials lacks a clear historical or constitutional frame-
work. Federal legislators enjoy a broad immunity from liability
through the Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution. 7 This
immunity extends in many cases to members of the legislative
staff," and is bounded only by the "sphere of legitimate legislative
activity."' 9 The absolute immunity of judges"0 for discretionary acts
performed in their official capacity originated at common law and
has been ratified by consistent opinions in this country.2 Such abso-
lute immunity is based upon "the obvious justice that a man should
not be liable for a mistaken opinion, honestly given, when the very
nature of his position requires the giving of that opinion."2 The
16. As with other personal governmental immunities, personal immunity for executives is
somewhat suspect in that it is antithetical to the Anglo-American common law tradition of
universal accountability for misdeeds. See generally Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability
for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 2-5 (1974); Jennings, Tort Liability
of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REv. 263, 263-70 (1937). A frequently quoted passage
from a leading British constitutional scholar asserts: "With us every official, from the Prime
Minister down to a constable or a collector of taxes, is under the same responsibility for every
act done without legal justification as any other citizen." A. DicEY, THE LAW OF THE
CONsTrruriON 193 (10th ed. 1959). See also note 144 infra.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. See, e.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Gravel
v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); United
States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
18. See, e.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 311-13 (1973) (committee investigator, con-
sultant, and staff); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 613-22 (1972) (administrative aide
to Senator).
19. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951).
20. Judicial immunity extends to jurors, counsel, and prosecutors, as well as to the activi-
ties of non-traditional judicial bodies such as bankruptcy commissions. Gray, Private Wrongs
of Public Servants, 47 CAL. L. REv. 303, 312-14 (1959). In Imbler v. Pachtman, 96 S. Ct. 984
(1976), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the state prosecutor's absolute immunity in suits
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See note 91 infra.
21. See, e.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347-51 (1871); O'Bryan v. Chandler,
352 F.2d 987, 988 (10th Cir. 1965). See generally Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation:
Judicial Proceedings, 9 COLUM. L. REv. 463 (1909).
22. Gray, supra note 20, at 310 (footnote omitted). Although conceding that to be the
common rationale for according judicial immunity, Gray, himself, offers a more skeptical
view:
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immunity of executive officials, on the other hand, is based more
on pragmatic considerations than on historical background or con-
stitutional mandate. In addition, rather than being formed of its
own rationale, executive immunity to a large extent is derivative of
judicial immunity.2 3
Spalding v. Vilas
The Supreme Court case Spalding v. Vilas24 generally is regarded
as the progenitor of the doctrine of absolute immunity for federal
executive officials.25 In Spalding, the plaintiff charged that the Post-
master General had maliciously defamed him and had interfered
with his business. Spalding was a lawyer who had contracted with
a large number of local postmasters to represent their claims in
Washington for adjustment of their compensation .2 Although it
passed legislation granting the additional compensation, Congress
attached a rider stipulating that the payments were to be made
directly to the postmasters, thus bypassing Spalding. The Postmas-
ter General then mailed the payments directly to the postmasters,
informing them by enclosed circular that "Congress desired all the
proceeds to reach the persons really entitled thereto. '27 On the basis
of this circular, Spalding sued the Postmaster for defamation. The
Supreme Court deemed the issue of the Postmaster General's im-
munity to be a question of whether the official could be held person-
ally liable for an act "not unauthorized by law, nor beyond the scope
of his official duties. 2 8 Upon examining cases upholding the im-
munity of judicial officials,2 the Court concluded that similar policy
The judge has truly been the pampered child of the law, for he is among those
privileged few who are allowed to fulfill their duties not only stupidly or negli-
gently, but willfully, maliciously, corruptly or just plain dishonestly, yet escape
liability to those damaged by his conduct. A cynic might be forgiven for pointing
out just who made this law ....
Id. at 309 (footnote omitted).
23. See Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896). See generally Jennings, supra note 16,
at 276-80. See also Handler & Klein, The Defense of Privilege in Defamation Suits Against
Government Executive Officials, 74 HARv. L. REv. 44, 53-56 (1960), in which the authors
distinguish the two branches of government and criticize linking judicial and executive im-
munity.
24. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
25. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 782.
26. 161 U.S. at 484-85.
27. Id. at 487.
28. Id. at 493.
29. E.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871); Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7
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considerations dictated absolute immunity from suit for heads of
executive departments acting within the scope of their general du-
ties.' To subject a high official to possible liability because of his
motives, the Court asserted, would "seriously cripple the proper and
effective administration of public affairs." '3'
Because the lawfulness of the defendant official's action was not
in issue, relying on Spalding as a source of tort immunity has been
criticized. 32 Nonetheless, Spalding became the basis of a doctrine of
absolute immunity for the upper echelons of government officials,
in suits for defamation 3 as well as other common law torts.34 Fur-
thermore, the case was the precursor of Barr v. Matteo,3 which
"democratized" Spalding's doctrine of absolute immunity for fed-
eral executives by making the defense dependent upon the scope of
the individual's duties rather than upon the title of his office.
Barr v. Matteo
Barr arose as a defamation action by two employees of the federal
Rent Stabilization Agency against the acting director of that
agency. The defendant had issued a press release threatening to
suspend the plaintiffs for their part in instituting a leave payment
plan that was the subject of Congressional criticism. 36 In a plurality
opinion 37 the Supreme Court asserted that the growth of governmen-
tal activity mandated the availability of absolute immunity for all
federal officials, contingent on the scope of their duties rather than
on their position. As the Court explained, "[t]he privilege is not a
Wall.) 523 (1869); Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 (N.Y. 1810). See note 23 supra & accompa-
nying text.
30. 161 U.S. at 498.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 16, at 51-52; Gray, supra note 20, at 336-37.
33. See, e.g., Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 665 (1941)
(S.E.C. commissioners); Glass v. Ickes, 117 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
718 (1941) (Interior Secretary); Mellon v. Brewer, 18 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 275
U.S. 530 (1927) (Treasury Secretary).
34. See, e.g., Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949
(1950) (Attorneys General, false imprisonment); Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.2d 135 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 305 U.S. 642 (1938) (Comptroller of Currency and deputies, malicious prosecu-
tion); Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S.
605 (1934) (Treasury Secretary, erroneous tax assessment).
35. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
36. Id. at 566-67.
37. Justice Harlan, the author of the opinion, was joined by Justices Frankfurter, Clark,
and Whittaker. Justice Black issued an opinion concurring in the judgement. Chief Justice
Warren (joined by Justice Douglas), Justices Stewart and Brennan wrote dissents.
1977]
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badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a policy
designed to aid in the effective functioning of government."" Al-
though acknowledging the question as a close one, the Court con-
cluded that the defendant's issuance of the allegedly libelous release
was a permissible exercise of the discretion a high level official must
possess if the public service is to function adequately. 9 Barr also
echoed Spalding's treatment of the issue of malice or lack of good
faith and found that because the defendant's action was within the
"outer perimeter" of his line of duty, the privilege was applicable
despite allegations of malice in the complaint. 0
Barr also relied heavily on Gregoire v. Biddle,4' a Second Circuit
decision holding that various Justice Department officials should be
absolutely immune from a suit for false imprisonment. In particu-
lar, the Court in Barr reiterated Gregoire's justification for the im-
position of a threshold bar to suit: "[T]o submit all officials, the
innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the
inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but
the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching dis-
charge of their duties."42
Despite the lack of a majority opinion in Barr,4" the decision es-
tablished the standard of immunity to be applied to federal execu-
tive officials in common law tort suits: a determination that the
action was "within the outer perimeter of [the official's] line of
duty"" and was an exercise of discretion, ends the court's inquiry,
thus precluding any examination of whether the action was moti-
vated by good faith or by personal animus. Although commentators
criticized its expansiveness,"s courts subsquently applied the Barr
immunity doctrine in numerous defamation cases against federal
executive officials. Courts also applied the standard in cases alleg-
38. 360 U.S. at 572-73.
39. Id. at 574-75.
40. Id. at 575.
41. 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
42. 360 U.S. at 571, quoting from 177 F.2d at 581.
43. See note 37 supra & accompanying text.
44. 360 U.S. at 575.
45. See, e.g., Handler & Klein, supra note 23, at 64-68.
46. See, e.g., Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959); Ruderer v. Meyer, 413 F.2d 175 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 936 (1969); Heine v. Raus, 399 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 914 (1971); Bowman v. White, 388 F.2d 756 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
891 (1968); Denman v. White, 316 F.2d 524 (1st Cir. 1963); Brownfield v. Landon, 307 F.2d
389 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 924(1962). One commentator has characterized Heine
v. Raus as a "strikingly obnoxious" example of the unwarranted extension of absolute im-
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ing other forms of tortious conduct by federal employees. 7
EXECUTIVE IMMUNITY IN THE CONTEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS
Although Barr established a standard of absolute immunity for
federal officials accused of common law torts, subsequent cases ex-
amined the standard applicable to constitutional torts. These cases
arose in the context of suits against state executive officials under
section 198348 and against federal officials under the implied right
of action for infringement of constitutional rights.
State Executive Officials: Scheuer v. Rhodes
Section 1983 was enacted to insure that constitutional rights
could not be infringed under color of state law. A literal reading of
the section suggests that no official sued under its provisions is
eligible for any degree of immunity. 9 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court held in Tenney v. Brandhove ° that the absolute immunity for
which state legislators were eligible at common law continued in
force under this statute.5 Similarly, in Pierson v. Ray,52 the Court
relied on Tenney in upholding the absolute immunity of state judges
for acts performed within the scope of their duties.
The issue of the degree of immunity to be granted state executive
officials sued under section 1983 also confronted the Court in
munity. W. GELLHORN, ADMINISTRA IVE LAw: CASES AND COMMENTS 349 (6th ed. 1974). In
Heine, a CIA agent was held absolutely immune for defaming, at the agency's direction, an
East European refugee, so as to discredit the plaintiff among his fellow refugees.
47. See, e.g., Scherer v. Brennan, 379 F.2d 609 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1021 (1967)
(trespass); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981 (1965)
(false arrest, assault, false imprisonment); Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 299
F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 827 (1963) (submitting false construction
progress reports).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States. . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
49. The text reads "Every person... shall be liable. See note 48 supra (emphasis
supplied).
50. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
51. The Court stated: "We cannot believe that Congress-itself a staunch advocate of
legislative freedom-would impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason.
.Id. at 376.
52. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
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Scheuer v. Rhodes,53 a suit by the representatives of the estates of
three students killed at Kent State University by the Ohio National
Guard. The suit charged that the intentional, willful, and wanton
deployment of the guard by the Governor of Ohio, the president of
the university, and various officials of the Ohio National Guard had
led directly to the students' deaths.54 The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed a summary dismissal of the suit by the dis-
trict court, holding that the action was precluded by the eleventh
amendment and alternatively that absolute executive immunity
barred action against the state officials.55
On appeal to the Supreme Court, a unanimous Court first re-
jected the contention of an eleventh amendment bar to the action,
holding on the basis of Ex Parte Young56 that the eleventh amend-
ment provides no protection for a state official charged with depriv-
ing another of a federal right under color of state law.57 To resolve
the immunity issue, the Court considered the policy rationales for
the doctrine of executive immunity, focusing on the historical con-
siderations of the inequity of subjecting to liability an officer who
is required to exercise discretion and on the possibility that the fear
of such liability would undermine his effectiveness in acting for the
public good.5"
Emphasizing the degree to which its immunity determination was
influenced by the statutory basis of the plaintiffs' claim, the Court
further noted that any resolution of the question must consider the
functons and responsibilities of the defendants as well as the pur-
pose of section 1983 to provide a means for redress of official torts."
Based on its review of the history of immunity defenses under that
statute, the Court rejected the polar alternatives of absolute im-
munity or a complete denial of immunity for state officials. Rather,
it concluded that:
[Iln varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers
of the executive branch of government, the variation being de-
pendent upon the scope of discretion and the responsibilities of
53. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
54. Id. at 235.
55. Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232 (1974).
56. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
57. 416 U.S. at 237.
58. Id. at 240.
59. Id. at 243.
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the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared
at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based.
It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at
the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-
faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of execu-
tive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.'"
Federal Executive Officials: Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
In 1964 the Supreme Court in Bell v. Hood' had held that federal
courts had jurisdiction to hear a complaint alleging a violation of
the plaintiff's fourth amendment rights by agents of the federal
government but had reserved answering whether such a violation
would render the agent personally liable in a damages action. In
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics,"2 the Court answered that question affirmatively, thereby
recognizing a cause of action derived directly from the Constitution.
The plaintiff claimed that federal agents had violated his fourth
amendment rights by illegally entering and searching his home.13
Remanding the case for a determination of the question of the fed-
eral officers' immunity,64 the Court held that the complaint stated
a cause of action under that amendment, and that damages could
be awarded if the plaintiff could prove injury."' Thus the Court
created the "Bivens tort,"" a cause of action against federal officials
60. Id. at 247-48. The Court may have expanded on this standard in Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. 308 (1975), in which it held that a school board member who allegedly violated a
student's constitutional rights "must be held to a standard of conduct based not only on
permissible intentions, but also on knowledge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights
of his charges." Id. at 322. This stipulation provoked a partial dissent by Justice Powell,
joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Rehnquist. In Justice Powell's
view the requirement appeared to impose a stricter standard of care upon public school
officials who were sued under section 1983 than that previously required of any other official.
420 U.S. at 327 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
62. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
63. Id. at 389.
64. Id. at 397-98.
65. Id. at 397.
66. Within the scope of its applicability, see note 67 infra, the "Bivens tort" action is the
federal cognate of the section 1983 action against a state official for violation of a federal right.
This equivalence has particular relevance in the context of immunity determination. In
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir.
1972), for instance, that counterpart state officers under section 1983 were entitled only to
qualified immunity was deemed an alternate reason for granting only qualified immunity to
federal officers. See also Brubaker v. King, 505 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1974) in which the court
1977]
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for alleged deprivations of rights guaranteed under the Constitu-
tion. 7
asserted that the standard for what constitutes a defense for a law enforcement officer is
identical under section 1983 and the fourth amendment. Id. at 536.
67. The future scope of the "Bivens tort" remains an unanswered question. The answer
might be determined through examination of three areas: (a) lower courts' treatment of the
applicability of the Bivens principle to guarantees other than those of the fourth amendment,
(b) evidence of the Supreme Court's attitude toward expansion of the Bivens principle beyond
the fourth amendment facts of that case, and (c) the possible preclusion of this right of action
because of the availability of an alternate remedy.
(a) Some lower courts and commentators have viewed the Bivens decision expansively,
suggesting that a "Bivens tort" can be fashioned out of any consitutional violation. See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1972) (Bivens not limited to
fourth amendment violations); Gardels v. Murphy, 377 F. Supp. 1389 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (Bivens
applies to any constitutionally protected interest); Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The
Constitution as a Sword, 85 Hnav. L. Rav. 1532, 1564 n.155 (1972); Note, Remedies for
Constitutional Torts: "Special Factors Counseling Hesitation", 9 IND. L. REv. 441, 446 (1976).
On the basis of Bivens, other courts have allowed a cause of action alleging violation of
constitutional rights other than those of the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Paton v. LaPrade,
524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975) (first amendment); States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Schultz, 498 F.2d
1146 (4th Cir. 1974) (fifth amendment); Butler v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 1035, 1039 (D.
Hawaii 1973) (first amendment). This expansive judicial interpretation of Bivens, however,
is not universal. See, e.g., Archuleta v. Callaway, 385 F. Supp. 384, 388 (D. Colo. 1974)
(application to alleged violation of fifth amendment would be unwarranted extension of
Bivens); Moore v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 163, 165 (D. Colo. 1974) (Bivens doctrine inappl-
icable to alleged violation of first amendment).
(b) The Supreme Court has been silent on the applicability of the Bivens doctrine to other
constitutional rights. In his concurring opinion in Bivens, however, Justice Harlan suggested
a restriction of the constitutional damages action on the basis of the courts' ability to fashion
a remedy:
[Tihe experience of judges in dealing with private trespass and false
imprisonment claims supports the conclusion that courts of law are capable of
making the types of judgment concerning causation and magnitude of injury
necessary to accord meaningful compensation for invasion of Fourth Amend-
ment rights . . . .The same, of course, may not be true with respect to other
types of constitutionally protected interests, and therefore the appropriateness
of money damages may well vary with the nature of the personal interest as-
serted.
403 U.S. at 409 & n.9 (Harlan, J., concurring). Moreover, the Court's decision in Paul v.
Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976), may well portend the Court's disapproval of expanding the
Bivens tort in that Paul clearly forecloses assertion of a defamation claim against a federal
officer as a constitutional tort under the fifth amendment. The plaintiff in Paul attempted
to sue a local police chief under section 1983 for distributing to local merchants a leaflet that
branded the plaintiff as an "Active Shoplifter." Id. at 1158. The Court rejected the invocation
of section 1983, asserting that to extend the fourteenth amendment's due process clause to
defamation actions, absent an allegation of an accompanying deprivation of a state right,
would "make of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon
whatever systems may already be administered by the States." Id. at 1160. By extension the
Court undoubtedly would reject any attempt to transform a defamation claim against a
federal official into a "Bivens tort" by simply framing the common law complaint as a
constitutional tort. Significantly, the Court cited Barr, noting that the opinion contained no
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In the immunity determination, the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit held"8 first that the officers were acting within their
scope of duty, because in making the arrest, they merely were fulfill-
ing their duties as narcotics agents. 9 Nevertheless, the court denied
the officers absolute immunity from the damages action and desig-
nated the availability of qualified immunity as dependent upon the
officers' good faith and reasonable belief in the validity of the arrest
and search. 0
Thus, the following standards emerged from the judicial determi-
nations of immunity for government executive officials: for federal
"intimation that any of the parties in [that case] nor any of the Members of this Court, had
the remotest idea that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment might itself form the
basis for a claim for defamation against federal officials." Id. at 1163. See generally Note,
The Supreme Court, 1975 Term: Due Process, 90 HAsv. L. REv. 56, 86-104 (1976).
(c) In 1974, Congress amended the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) to permit suits
against United States for the torts of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse
of process, or malicious prosecution committed by federal law enforcement agents acting
within the scope of their duty or under color of federal law. Act of March 16, 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-253, § 2, - Stat. _ . See S. Rep. No. 93-588, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2789, 2790. The amended portion of the Act now reads:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply
to-
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, de-
ceit, or interference with contract rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or
omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Gov-
ernment, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall
apply to any claim arising. . . out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of this subsec-
tion, "investigative or law enforcement officer" means any officer of the United
States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to
make arrests for violations of Federal law.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970 & Supp. 1975).
To the extent that the Supreme Court's decision in Bivens was based on the lack of a viable
alternative remedy, see 403 U.S. at 409-10 (Harlan, J., concurring), or to the extent the
existence of such an alternative statutory remedy might be a "special factor counselling
hesitation" in the implication of a constitutional cause of action, see 403 U.S. at 396-97, the
FTCA amendment may have eclipsed the Bivens decision. Regardless of the question of
exclusiveness of remedy, the amendment in practical terms makes possible a suit against a
defendant who will not be judgment-proof. See generally Boger, Gitenstein, & Verkuil, The
Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Tort Amendment: An Interpretive Analysis, 54 N.C.L.
REv. 497, 537-39 (1976).
68.Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d
Cir. 1972).
69. Id. at 1343.
70. Id. at 1348. As noted previously, the appellate court did not denominate it to be
qualified immunity, but rather termed it a defense. See note 8 supra.
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officers charged with common law torts, Barr mandated absolute
immunity; for state and federal executives charged with infringe-
ments of federal and constitutional rights, Scheuer and Bivens re-
spectively prescribed a standard of immunity predicated on proof
of good faith and reasonable belief.
ECONOMOU V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Against this background, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit decided Economou v. United States Department of
Agriculture.7' Pursuant to the Commodity Exchange Act," the Sec-
retary of Agriculture in 1970 issued an administrative complaint
against Arthur Economou, a registered futures commission mer-
chant, and his trading company. The complaint alleged that Econ-
omou had failed to maintain the minimum capital balance required
under Commodity Exchange Authority (CEA) rules," and ordered
Economou to show cause why his trading registration should not be
revoked. A Department of Agriculture (USDA) hearing examiner
subsequently issued a report adverse to Economou.
Before the Department's judicial officer had completed review of
the administrative report, Economou instituted a suit seeking in-
junctive relief and damages of $32,000,000. The thirteen defendants
included the Department of Agriculture, the Commodity Exchange
Authority, and various officials of the two agencies. The complaint
alleged that the agencies and their employees had instituted the
administrative action against Economou maliciously to ruin his
business reputation and to retaliate for his criticism of the agencies'
operations. Additionally, the suit charged that the defendants had
issued deceptive press releases implying that Economou's financial
status had deteriorated. As a consequence, Economou complained,
he had suffered losses in business and impaired credit standing, and
was forced to defend himself against the false charges. 4
Following the court's denial of the requested injunctive relief, and
the USDA judicial officer's affirmance of the administrative find-
ings, Economou petitioned for judicial review. Because the agency
had initiated its proceedings without first issuing the customary
71. 535 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted sub nom. Butz v. Economou, 45 U.S.L.W.
3570 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 76-709).
72. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1970).
73. 17 C.F.R. § 1.17 (1976).
74. 535 F.2d at 689-90.
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warning letter, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit set aside
the administrative enforcement order as erroneous." Subsequently,
the district court dismissed Economou's tort action on the grounds
that the defendants were entitled to absolute immunity, and Econ-
omou appealed.
As Congress had not granted permission for either agency to be
sued in its own name, the appellate court first affirmed the dis-
missal of the claims against USDA and CEA. The court also fore-
closed amendment of the complaint to substitute the United States
as defendant, holding that the institutional claims were barred by
the intentional tort exclusion of the Federal Tort Claims Act."6 As
to the individual defendants, although acknowledging that the
lower court's dismissal was predicated on the precedential authority
of Barr v. Matteo's doctrine of absolute executive immunity, the
court held that decisions subsequent to Barr compelled reversal of
the dismissal."
The appellate court then reviewed the Supreme Court decisions
that had examined the immunity accorded a state executive official
in suits brought under section 1983,11 concluding that although
damages suits against public officials could serve the public interest
by discouraging abusive official action, such suits also posed the
hazard of inhibiting effective government operation." Moreover,
examining federal common law immunity, the court conceded that
federal courts previously had "leaned toward" a grant of absolute
immunity to executive officials, 0 yet noted that state courts in con-
trast often had imposed liability for official actions motivated by
malice."
75. Economou v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 494 F.2d 519, 519 (2d Cir. 1974).
76. 535 F.2d at 690. The court observed that the claims did not fall within the recent
amendment to the FrCA intentional tort exclusion, see note 67 supra, because the defen-
dants' alleged actions occurred before the amendment's enactment and because the defen-
dants were not law enforcement officers within the definition of the Act. 535 F.2d at 690 n.2.
77. Id. at 691.
78. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Imbler v. Pachtman, 96 S. Ct. 984 (1976).
79. 535 F.2d at 694.
80. Id. at 695, citing Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896) and Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d
579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950). To suggest that those opinions merely
"leaned toward" a grant of absolute immunity is to understate their holdings dramatically;
rather, the decisions held directly for absolute immunity, and provided the precedential basis
for Barr's seminal doctrine of absolute immunity for federal officials. See notes 24-42 supra
& accompanying text.
81. The court's citation of state immunity holdings must be regarded as historical dictum:
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Applying the policy considerations that corroborated absolute
immunity for the three branches of government, the court held that
the individual defendants in Economou neither required nor were
entitled to absolute immunity in performing their duties, and
argued that a qualified immunity standard as endorsed by the Su-
preme Court in Scheuer, that is, one grounded on the defendant's
good faith and reasonable belief, would afford adequate protection."
Therefore the court reversed the dismissal and remanded the case
for a lower court determination of the defendants' good faith and
reasonable belief. 3
CONTEMPORANEOUS APPELLATE IMMUNITY DECISIONS
Expeditions Unlimited
Using reasoning similar to that of the court in Economou, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
in 1976 in Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enterprises, Inc. v.
Smithsonian Institution"' denied absolute immunity to a federal
official accused of the common law tort of defamation. That deci-
sion, however, was vacated and the case was reargued before the
court of appeals en banc.15 In Expeditions the owner of an underwa-
ter archaeological excavation firm brought a defamation action on
behalf of himself and the corporation against the Smithsonian Insti-
tution, three of its regents, and Evans, the chairman of the anthro-
pology department of the Smithsonian's natural history museum.
The alleged defamation was contained in a letter written by Evans
to a South American museum director criticizing the plaintiff's pro-
fessional qualifications."5
On appeal from a summary dismissal of the complaints against
both the institutional defendants and Evans personally, the court
the Supreme Court has emphasized that the immunity of federal officials is to be determined
solely by federal standards. See note 3 supra.
82. 535 F.2d at 696.
83. Id. at 697.
84. No. 74-1899 (D.C. Cir. June 28, 1976), petition for cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3202 (U.S.
Sept. 28, 1976) (No.'76-418), vacated for rehearing en banc, (D.C. Cir. Oct. 20, 1976) (en banc
order) [hereinafter cited as Expeditions Unlimited].
85. The en banc reargument, dealing solely with the three judge panel's immunity determi-
nation, was held December 16, 1976. A decision is pending.
86. Defendant Evans' letter referred to the plaintiff corporation as a group of "purely
treasure hunters" who "have been in several unfavorable situations in Florida that have
caused the name of the company to be changed several times to avoid litigation." Brief for
Appellees at 4.
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of appeals affirmed the former dismissal. 7 As to Evans, however,
the court refused to uphold the district court's summary dismissal
of the suit on grounds of absolute immunity; instead, the appeals
court reversed and remanded the case for a determination of abso-
lute or qualified immunity.
In the appellate court's view, the determination of whether an
executive official" was to receive the added protection of absolute
immunity involved an ad hoc weighing of all the factors of that
individual case, rather then the application of a categorical stan-
dard.89 Citing Barr's rationale of absolute immunity as "an expres-
sion of policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of govern-
ment,"10 the court said that the cases following Barr had evidenced
use of a "complex, factoring approach," awarding immunity only in
circumstances in which such action would be in the government's
best interests.
To support this contention, the court observed that with the
exception of Imbler v. Pachtman,' a 1976 case upholding a
87. In dismissing the complaint against the institutional defendants, the court first deter-
mined that although the Smithsonian had a "substantial private dimenson," it nevertheless
was a "federal agency" by virtue of its function as a national museum, government funding,
and federal oversight. Expeditions Unlimited, No. 74-1899, slip op. at 3. In the same manner
as the court in Economou, see note 76 supra & accompanying text, the court then held that
the claim against the Smithsonian fell within the "intentional torts" exclusion to FTCA. Id.
at 10-11.
88. The court confined its consideration of qualified immunity to executive officials, citing
the historic principles of absolute immunity for legislators and judges. Id. at 12 n.25.
89. The court acknowledged the "categorical prerequisites" of scope of duty and discre-
tionary acts, but asserted that those factors "single out those cases where no immunity of
any kind is justified," rather than being determinative of absolute as opposed to qualified
immunity. Id. at 14.
90. Id. at 17, quoting from 360 U.S. at 572-73.
91. 96 S. Ct. 984 (1976). In determining that a state prosecutor was absolutely immune
from tort suit under section 1983 for prosecutorial acts performed within the scope of his
duties, the Court followed the same reasoning process it had used in earlier section 1983
immunity cases. It first analyzed the underlying policy considerations of the scope of the
official's immunity at common law: in the case of the prosecutor, these considerations in-
cluded the danger that harassing lawsuits would divert a prosecutor's attention from his
responsibilities, and the related concern that such a threat would impair the independence
of his judgment. Id. at 991. The Court then weighed these factors against countervailing
remedial purposes of secton 1983, concluding that the concerns motivating absolute prosecu-
torial immunity at common law applied with equal force to suits brought under the civil
rights statute. Id. at 993. Moreover, as in its determinations of absolute immunity under
section 1983 for judges, see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1567), and for legislators, see Tenney
v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), the Court deemed the policy considerations favoring such
blanket immunity so significant as to prevail over a citizen's ability to seek redress for an
alleged violation of his constitutional rights.
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prosecutor's absolute immunity in a section 1983 case, in every post-
Barr case examining executive immunity the Supreme Court con-
cluded that only qualified immunity was appropriate.2 Integral to
the court's decision was its view that
[tihese recent decisions by the Supreme Court clearly foreclose
any conclusion on our part that there is an absolute immunity for
executive officials which is to be mechanistically applied to dis-
cretionary actions within the scope of duty. While a bright-line
rule is to be preferred where circumstances permit, the cases
make completely clear that no such rule is possible here, and no
effort to distinguish the cases can demonstrate otherwise. 3
Although acknowledging that arguably the Supreme Court holdings
on immunity under section 1983 were inapposite to a case involving
a common law tort by a federal executive official,94 the court con-
cluded that there was no reason that a "qualitatively different ap-
proach should apply in § 1983 cases."9
Peterson v. Weinberger
The eclectic approach to the determination of federal executive
immunity in Economou and Expeditions Unlimited contrasts
sharply with the recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Peterson v. Weinberger." The action in Peterson
arose out of a case of alleged fraudulent billing for Medicare claims
by a physician and his brother, the owner of a nursing home. The
physician then sued the Department of Health, Education, and
The appellate court in Economou rejected an analogy between the functions of the execu-
tive administrative officers in that case and the functions of judges and prosecutors requiring
absolute immunity, in that the duties of judicial officers were more discretionary than those
of executive officials and as such rendered judges and prosecutors more vulnerable to personal
damages suits. The court also suggested that judicial officials either would have to bear the
costs of their defense personally or would have to seek legal assistance from another branch
of government; in contrast, executive officials would be able to use counsel provided by their
own branch of government. 535 F.2d at 695-96. See notes 130-34 infra & accompanying text.
92. In Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973), the Court did not disturb an appellate court
determination of absolute immunity for school board officials acting within the scope of their
employment under applicable law. Id. at 324 n.15. The court in Expeditions Unlimited
observed that "there appears to be some tension" between that ruling and the Court's deter-
mination of qualified immunity for school board officials in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308
(1975). Expeditions Unlimited, No. 74-1899, slip op. at 18 n.42.
93. Expeditions Unlimited, No. 74-1899, slip op. at 24.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 25.
96. 508 F.2d 45 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Peterson v. Mathews, 423 U.S. 830 (1975).
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Welfare (HEW), the Secretary of HEW, and officials of lower eche-
lons of the department. He claimed that the defendants had con-
spired to prevent him from practicing medicine, had taken his
property without due process, and had maliciously interfered with
his contractual rights. As a result, the plaintiff charged, he was
forced to defend himself in civil and criminal actions brought by the
government. 7
The appeals court summarily affirmed the dismissal of the mali-
cious conspiracy claim and concluded that no due process violation
had occurred." The Court's treatment of the immunity issue was
equally cursory in that it merely outlined briefly the responsibilities
of each of the individual defendants and concluded that none of the
individual defendants had acted outside of his line of duty or scope
of employment in fulfilling his official responsibilities." Moreover,
the court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the defendants
were too subordinate in rank to claim absolute immunity, adopting
instead the reasoning of Barr that the scope of an executive officer's
immunity depended on the duties with which he was entrusted
rather than on his title or rank.'"' Inasmuch as the purportedly
tortious acts were committed during an investigation of alleged vio-
lations of the Medicare Act by agents responsible for overseeing the
Medicare program, the court concluded that all the agents were
shielded by immunity.'0 '
Unlike the courts in Economou and in Expeditions Unlimited, the
court in Peterson neither noted nor analyzed the post-Barr cases
considering executive immunity under section 1983. In a situation
involving a federal executive official charged with a common law
tort, the court simply applied the two-step determination of Barr,
and, finding that the executive defendants' acts were within the
scope of their duty and of a discretionary nature, 102 affirmed the
dismissal of the claims.
ECONOMOU: DISTINCTIONS THE COURT OMITTED
The holding of Economou failed to recognize the distinction be-
97. Id. at 49.
98. Id. at 50.
99. Id. at 51.
100. Id., quoting from 360 U.S. at 573-74.
101. 508 F.2d at 51.
102. The court applied the discretion test suggested in Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v.
Floete, 299 F.2d 655 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 827 (1963). See note 5 supra.
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tween constitutional torts and common law torts committed by ex-
ecutive officials of the government. Despite the dictum in the opin-
ion that the plaintiff's claim were "cast in constitutional terms"'1
as well as an ambiguous footnote reference to the Bivens immunity
decision and other circuits' holdings of qualified immunity for fed-
eral defendants accused of constitutional torts,04 the court appar-
ently regarded the defendants' alleged actions as constituting
merely common law torts. 05 Yet the bulk of the opinion was based
on the Supreme Court's analysis of immunity in the context of
alleged deprivation of constitutional rights. The court in Economou
thus seemed to concur in the assumption of the majority in
Expeditions Unlimited that the Supreme Court by its subsequent
immunity decisions had overruled Barr sub silentio. 05 Moreover, as
the court in Expeditions Unlimited had done, the court in
Economou failed to recognize the distinctions that should be drawn
between constitutional torts and common law torts, and the influ-
ence these distinctions may have on the extent of immunity granted
to executive officials.
Textual Support for Barr v. Matteo's Continued Viability
In refusing to acknowledge the Supreme Court's decision in Barr
as binding precedent in its immunity determination, the court in
Economou contended that the Court had "elucidated its views" in
subsequent immunity decisions. 07 Similarly, the majority in
Expeditions Unlimited emphasized the Court's failure to award
absolute immunity in section 1983 cases arising between Barr and
Imbler v. Pachtman.0° Such assertions, however, are at best an
inconclusive response to the question of whether Barr's absolute
immunity doctrine remains the applicable standard; contrary argu-
ments deserve attention. For instance, during the Barr-to-Imbler
period the Court at least tacitly supported the continued vitality of
Barr's absolute immunity doctrine through its frequent denial of
103. 535 F.2d at 690.
104. Id. at 695 n.7.
105. Given the Supreme Court's decision in Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976), it is
doubtful that Economou's claims could be read to allege a constitutional tort even under
an expansive reading of Bivens. See note 67 supra.
106. See Expeditions Unlimited, No. 74-1899, slip op., dissent at 1 (Leventhal, J., dissent-
ing).
107. 535 F.2d at 691.
108. 96 S. Ct. 984 (1976).
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certiorari to lower court decisions awarding absolute immunity on
the basis of Barr."I Moreover, that the Court in Scheuer in accord-
ing only qualified immunity twice cited Barr approvingly" has been
relied on as further textual support to the conclusion that Scheuer
did not sub silentio overrule Barr."' A textual analysis of the rela-
tionship between the Court's section 1983 holdings and Barr at most
suggests an ambiguous treatment of Barr and may even corroborate
the contention that the Court regarded Barr as both distinct and
distinguishable, but does not establish that those subsequent cases
overruled Barr's holding of absolute immunity, either directly or sub
silentio.
The Distinction of Magnitude
Beyond textual considerations, the court's failure to recognize
valid distinctions between constitutional torts and common law
torts warrants examination. One feature distinguishing the two
types of actions is the qualitative difference of the rights involved.
Suits brought under the Bivens doctrine or section 1983 allege in-
fringements of fundamental, federally secured rights. The plaintiff
in Bivens alleged a violation of a basic guarantee of the Bill of
Rights, that is, protection against unreasonable search and
seizure;"' the plaintiffs in Scheuer alleged a perpetration of the
"ultimate form of constitutional injury. . . : the taking of life with-
out due process.""' In contrast, the plaintiffs in Barr alleged the
impairment of their reputations through the common law tort of
defamation."4 Similarly in Economou, the plaintiff charged that his
109. See denials of certiorari at notes 46 and 47 supra. That the Court cited Barr on only
eleven occasions in the fifteen years between that decision and the qualified immunity deci-
sion in Scheuer, could be interpreted as further indication that the Court regarded Barr's
absolute executive immunity holding as settled doctrine.
110. 416 U.S. at 242, 247. In evaluating the Court's view of the relationship between the
two cases, it is significant that the Court in Scheuer characterized Barr's fact situation as
merely "somewhat parallel," id. at 242, (emphasis supplied) suggesting that it regarded the
earlier case as distinguishable. Scheuer's other reference to Barr specifically mentioned that
it arose "[iln a context other than a § 1983 suit." Id. at 247.
111. See Shipp v. Waller, 391 F. Supp. 283, 285 n.18 (D.D.C. 1975). See generally Note,
Damages for Federal Employment Discrimination: Section 1981 and Qualified Executive
Immunity, 85 YALE L.J. 518, 528 & n.54 (1975).
112. 403 U.S. at 389-90.
113. Verkuil, Immunity or Responsibility for Unconstitutional Conduct: The Aftermath of
Jackson State and Kent State, 50 N.C.L. REv. 548, 593 (1972).
114. Cf. Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976) (defamation alone does not state section 1983
claim).
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business reputation and credit rating had been impaired." 1. Despite
the seriousness to the individual plaintiff of the latter torts, the
disproportion between the severity of the injuries in the two classes
of cases is clear.
In those decisions treating constitutional tort immunity, the
plaintiff has alleged executive official action either violative of the
Bill of Rights or patently unjustified under the fourteenth amend-
ment."' The defendant's alleged action has involved "a brutality or
arbitrariness which goes beyond the garden variety state tort ac-
tion""' and has caused injury that transcends mere pecuniary dam-
age." In recognition of the aggravated quality of the conduct in a
constitutional tort one commentator has suggested that to consti-
tute a section 1983 constitutional tort the defendant's conduct must
be "outrageous.""' 9 Notwithstanding the problems of subjectivity
such a test would pose, 20 the "outrageous" formulation serves to
emphasize an important and distinctive feature of the constitu-
tional tort: the alleged injury is more fundamental, grave, and com-
pelling than that in the common law tort.
This feature of the consitutional tort correlates with the degree of
immunity to which a constitutional tort defendant is entitled. When
fundamental human rights guaranteed by the federal government
are violated, it is both sound and just that a federal court should
limit the government executive defendant to a standard of immuity
requiring the defendant to prove his good faith and reasonable be-
lief. In common law tort actions involving injuries of a lesser magni-
tude, the appropriateness of such a limitation is not so manifest.
The Distinction of Purpose
In addition to the degree of magnitude, the purposes served by
constitutional tort and common law tort actions against government
officials are distinguishable. Both types of suits are actuated in part
by the desire of an injured individual to be compensated for the
115. 535 F.2d at 690.
116. Verkuil, supra note 113, at 596.
117. Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L.
REv. 277, 327 (1965).
118. Verkuil, supra note 113 at 568 & n.l15.
119. Shapo, supra note 117, at 327.
120. See Bristow, § 1983: An Analysis and Suggested Approach, 29 ARK. L. REV. 255, 309-
12 (1975); McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement
of Constitutional Protections, Part 1, 60 VA. L. REv. 1, 8-10 (1974).
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harm he has suffered. 2' As an important adjunct to this individual-
istic component of relief, however, the constitutional tort action
serves a broader societal function. In imposing personal liability on
the government defendant, the constitutional tort action may influ-
ence official conduct and force changes in standards of behavior. 22
The Supreme Court's constitutional tort decisions have recog-
nized the remedial/coercive function of that type of suit. In Monroe
v. Pape,"3 a section 1983 case, the Court outlined the broad reme-
dial purposes of that statute: to override some state laws, to provide
a redress for constitutional claims when state law was inadequate,
and to provide a federal remedy when the state remedy, although
available in theory, was withheld in practice.'24 In the Bivens fact
situation, the creation of the damages remedy was predicated par-
tially on the unavailability of the major deterrent to violations of an
individual's fourth amendment rights-the exclusionary rule. 25
Because the search and seizure yielded no evidence, there would be
no subsequent trial of Bivens and no opportunity to discourage im-
proper police conduct by exclusion of the evidence. 26
Imposing absolute immunity for such actions would blunt the
remedial/coercive function of the constitutional tort. As Justice
White observed in Imbler v. Pachtman: "It is manifest. . . that all
state officials as a class cannot be immune absolutely from damage
suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that to extend absolute immunity
to any group of state officials is to negate pro tanto the very remedy
which it appears Congress sought to create."'2 7 Similarly, to extend
Barr's absolute immunity standard to federal executive officials
accused of constitutional torts would undermine the remedial effect
of Bivens, rendering that decision "an idle sport."'28
121. See Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HAuv. L. REv. 72 (1942).
122. See Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5, 9-
10 (1974); Note, The Doctrine of Official Immunity Under The Civil Rights Act, 68 HARV. L.
REv. 1229, 1233 (1955).
123. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
124. Id. at 173-74. See also Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1168 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); cf. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
125. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
126. Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Bivens condemned the exclusionary rule and criti-
cized the rule's deterrent rationale. 403 U.S. at 411, 415-18 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In its
place, he proposed congressional enactment of a statute that would provide a quasi-judicial
remedy against the government itself, and permit use of the illegally obtained evidence. Id.
at 422-24.
127. 96 S. Ct. at 996-97 (White, J., concurring).
128. Dellinger, supra note 67, at 1554.
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The qualified immunity standard, however, effectuates the reme-
dial purposes of the constitutional tort action in at least two re-
spects. First, it enables the plaintiff to forestall dismissal of his
action, even though dismissal would be warranted under an abso-
lute immunity standard.'29 Second, the standard requires the defen-
dant to prove affirmatively his good faith and reasonable belief in
the validity of the contested act. The qualified immunity standard,
then, comports with both the magnitude of the interest asserted in
a consitutional tort action, and with the special social function
served by such a suit.
The Distinction of Duties
Not only did the court in Economou fail to distinguish adequately
between constitutional and common law torts, and to recognize the
qualities of the former type of action that comport with a grant of
qualified immunity, it also gave inadequate consideration to the
significance of the defendants' particular duties. The pivotal policy
consideration underlying Barr's grant of absolute immunity to
federal officials was that such officials should be able to conduct
the functions of government without the fear of personal damage
suits resulting from their actions, inasmuch as the threat of such
suits would inhibit the officials' independent judgment and hence
the performance of their duties. 3 0 This concern for effective govern-
ment operation has particular relevance in the context of a regula-
tory's agency's enforcement functions. Economou arose in this con-
text; its defendants were the officials responsible for enforcing
federal regulatory policy, that is, requiring futures commission mer-
chants to maintain a minimum capital balance. Moreover, the du-
ties of initiating and conducting administrative enforcement pro-
ceedings arguably are comparable to those performed by judges and
prosecutors, who as a class are accorded absolute immunity. There-
fore, the defendants in Economou may be entitled as well to abso-
lute immunity.
The decision of an official of a governmental agency to apply the
government's regulatory enforcement procedures is likely to have a
more significant governmental effect than a government official's
decision, as in Barr, to issue a press release relating to the internal
129. See note 8 supra.
130. 360 U.S. at 571.
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problems of his agency; 3' the administrative function has a more
direct relationship to the effective operation of government than
does the public information function represented in Barr."2 Con-
versely, the danger of curtailing effective administrative enforce-
ment through the threat of personal litigation presents a greater
hazard to the governmental interest than does the possibility of
inhibiting such functions of the federal bureaucracy as information
dissemination. Thus, it would appear federal executive officials
involved in administrative enforcement proceedings especially need
the insulation from extraneous pressures that absolute immunity
provides, for their duties of resolving controversies and enforcing
administrative regulations relate directly rather than tangentially
to the ability of government to function effectively, and render them
peculiarly Sensitive to the danger posed by damages suits. Nonethe-
less, the court in Economou neither acknowledged that the facts
before it, which involved conducting an enforcement procedure,
might present particularly compelling reasons for granting absolute
executive immunity, nor did it attempt to differentiate the duties
of executive officials which might call for varying degrees of immun-
ity. Rather, the court merely undertook a comparison of the broad
fields of legislative, judicial, and executive immunity.' Yet it is the
actual duties performed rather than the title or branch of govern-
ment that is dispositive of the scope of immunity mandated.'34
INDEPENDENT ARGUMENTS FOR QUALIFIED COMMON LAW TORT
IMMUNITY
To suggest that Ecomonou's holding was mistaken in its premises
does not preclude an independent evaluation of the merits of quali-
fied immunity for federal executives. Because an examination of
immunity from common law tort suit does not encompass the con-
siderations of constitutional or statutory purpose involved in consti-
tutional tort immunity, the examination essentially must be based
on policy judgment. In this respect, in the common law context the
phrases "absolute immunity" and "qualified immunity" are labels
expressing the degree to which a plaintiff's right to a remedy will
131. Id. at 574-75.
132. But see Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1959) (Black, J., concurring), in which
Justice Black based his concurrence on the importance of informed public opinion.
133. 535 F.2d at 695-96.
134. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. at 573-74.
19771
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
be curtailed to further the interest in government efficiency. Quali-
fied immunity limits that right in that it provides a conditional
defense; absolute immunity denies the plaintiff's right altogether.
The Supreme Court in Barr adopted Gregoire v. Biddle's'" ration-
ale for justifying absolute immunity:
There must indeed be means of punishing public officers who
have been truant to their duties; but that is quite another matter
from exposing such as have been honestly mistaken to suit by
anyone who has suffered from their errors. As is so often the case,
the answer must be found in a balance between the evils inevita-
ble in either alternative.'36
The rationale is defective in at least two respects. First, it is
questionable whether a means of punishing the derelict public em-
ployee other than by tort action actually exists. Unless the officer
is a high ranking official who is "in the public eye" and under the
Chief Executive's control, or unless his conduct has been so egre-
gious as to warrant public attention,'37 the official may be shielded
from the consequences of his actions by the bureaucratic apparatus
of which he is a part.
Second, as Chief Justice Warren emphasized in his dissent to
Barr, the purported balancing process that Judge Hand described
results in a complete abrogation of the plaintiff's ability to vindicate
his rights.'38 No such "balancing" is necessary to effectuate the le-
gitimate goals of government. Admittedly, a qualified immunity
standard would expose the federal executive to greater danger of
judicial action in that such a standard would permit the tort action
to survive a motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted";'39 nevertheless, in the case of patently
vexatious claims, the government defendant could further curtail
the action through a motion for summary judgment. "' Thus, the
result of imposing a qualified immunity standard on federal execu-
135. 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
136. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. at 571-72, quoting from Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d at 581.
137. Cf., e.g., Ford Scores General on Jewish Remarks, Wash. Post, Nov. 14, 1974, at Al,
col. 4 (President reprimands Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff for remarks alleging undue
Jewish and Israeli influence on formation of foreign policy); Butz Resigns; Ford Calls Him
"Decent, Good", Wash. Post, Oct. 5, 1976, at Al, col. 5 (Secretary of Agriculture acknowl-
edges his resignation is result of "a gross indiscretion" in making racial remarks).
138. 360 U.S. 564, 578 (1959) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
139. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
140. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
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tives would not necessarily be "to submit all officials, the innocent
as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial."''
Moreover, another argument in favor of absolute immunity, that
exposure to personal liability and the legal expenses of personal
defense would discourage public service, is equally specious.' A
federal statute' provides counsel to a federal employee sued for
actions within the scope of his official duties, and in no recent im-
munity determination has a federal executive official been required
to pay for his own defense.'
CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit's decision in Economou v. United States De-
partment of Agriculture unjustifiably equates fact situations involv-
ing alleged common law torts with alleged infringement of constitu-
tional rights. On the basis of this equation, the court determined
that Supreme Court decisions awarding qualified immunity in con-
stitutional tort cases had eclipsed the Court's earlier absolute im-
munity determination in Barr v. Matteo. In making this determina-
tion, however, the court not only failed to distinguish the peculiar
purpose served by qualified immunity in constitutional tort actions,
but also failed to examine the purpose served by absolute immunity
for defendants engaged in administrative enforcement proceedings.
Nonetheless, a qualified immunity standard, rather than the abso-
lute immunity standard of Barr, arguably should apply to common
141. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d at 581.
142. See generally Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 590 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("a
gossamer web self-spun without a scintilla of support to which one can point."); Gray, supra
note 20, at 339 ("Such arguments offer a wry blend of fairy tale and horror story.").
143. The Solicitor General, or any officer of the Department of Justice, may
be sent by the Attorney General to any State or district in the United States to
attend to the interests of the United States in a suit pending in a court of the
United States, or in a court of a State, or to attend to any other interest of the
United States.
28 U.S.C. § 517 (1970).
144. One commentator suggests that eliminating, for the public employee, the fear of
litigation for his actions may not be an ideal goal for society:
The truth is, we do not, in the present state of man and government, want
anybody to be fearless. Citizens and officials alike ought to be afraid of some
things, including convictions for crimes and the risk of civil liability if they
wrong anybody. The absolute privilege protects an official from fear of the
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Becht, The Absolute Privilege of the Executive in Defamation, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1127, 1168-
69 (1962).
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law torts as well as to constitutional torts. Therefore, it is submitted
that the court in Economou reached the right result for the wrong
reasons.
The Supreme Court's consideration of Economou will enable the
Court to elucidate the relationship between constitutional and com-
mon law tort immunity, and to articulate the function of tort im-
munity for executive officials in parameters effectuating the pur-
poses of the underlying action. In addition, the case may provide the
Court with an opportunity to delimit more clearly the "Bivens tort,"
the action brought against a federal official for alleged infringement
of constitutional rights.
